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Abstract
Previous theoretical contributions on endogenous tariﬀ formation have focused on trade mod-
els with homogeneous goods and constant returns to scale. This paper investigates the political
equilibrium of trade policy when economic structure is instead characterized by diﬀerentiated
products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry trade. The result shows
that endogenous tariﬀs are positive for all industries with non-negligible shares of world pro-
duction. However, the level of protection is less than the optimal tariﬀ that would otherwise
be imposed by a benevolent government in an unorganized industry, and higher in an organized
industry. The protection provided to all unorganized (organized) industries increases (falls) with
the relative weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-` a-vis campaign contribu-
tions and falls with the fraction of the population that belongs to a lobby group. The model
also indicates that the endogenous tariﬀ level in an organized industry might be explosive. The
higher is the fraction of the population represented by a lobby and the higher is the weight on
aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function, the smaller is the possibility for such
an explosive tariﬀ.
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11 Introduction
In order to reconcile the discrepancy between the well-embraced doctrine of “free” trade in theory
and the prevalence of trade restrictions among nations in practice, the literature of endogenous
trade policy has proposed “politics” as the missing element. When “politics” is introduced into
conventional trade models, the best policy for a country in general is not necessarily pursued;
instead, a policy that solicits the most political support or survives in the political competition
process might be adopted. This endogenous trade policy determination process has been modelled
theoretically and documented empirically by a large and distinguished literature developed over
the years. For a comprehensive survey of this literature, the readers are referred to Rodrik (1995),
among others.
Previous theoretical contributions on endogenous determination of trade policy have focused on
models with homogeneous goods and constant returns to scale. The two major trade models which
are used most frequently are the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Magee et al. (1989), Mayer (1984)) and the
Ricardo-Viner model (Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Hillman (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1994)).
Thus the trade structure that underlies the alternative speciﬁcations of political process introduced
by these papers is restricted to one-way trade. It is therefore interesting to see what the pattern of
endogenous trade policy would look like when the economic structure is instead characterized by
diﬀerentiated products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry trade.
The optimal trade policy for a country under monopolistic competition has been studied by Gros
(1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987), among others. Gros (1987) used Krugman’s (1980) model
and showed that even a small country has an optimal positive tariﬀ, which equals the proportional
markup used by monopolistically competitive producers. When the model is broadened to include
both a homogeneous and a diﬀerentiated sector, Flam and Helpman (1987) showed that a small
tariﬀ is welfare improving, but that other industrial policies’ welfare consequences depend on details
of the production structure and the sectoral interlinkages through factor markets and preferences.
To investigate the political equilibrium of trade policy when countries are characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition and intra-industry trade, this paper embeds the Krugman (1980) model into
the Ricardo-Viner speciﬁc-factors model and uses the campaign contribution approach of Grossman
and Helpman (1994) to derive the endogenous tariﬀ equilibrium.
The result shows that when the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest of the
2world in an industry is negligible, the industry can not secure any import protection, regardless of
whether the government has the national interest in mind or is politically motivated. In general, as
the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest of the world in an industry decreases,
the endogenous tariﬀ decreases. In other words, a larger industry will receive higher protection,
regardless of whether the industry is represented by a lobby group or not. In Grossman and
Helpman (1994), however, this is only true for organized sectors. When an organized sector has a
larger domestic output relative to imports, it is protected by higher import tariﬀs. The size eﬀect
works in the opposite direction if the sector is unorganized. The larger is an unorganized industry
relative to its imports, the bigger is the magnitude of negative protection (import subsidies) it will
receive.
Furthermore, it is shown that the endogenous protection pattern that emerges from this study
actually parallels that of Grossman and Helpman (1994) very much, if we adjust for the diﬀerence
in the benchmark (optimal) tariﬀ levels, which are free trade in Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a
small competitive economy and positive tariﬀs in the current study with monopolistic competition.
Under both economic structures, the protection levels for organized sectors are higher than the
benchmark level while they are lower than the benchmark level for all unorganized sectors. As
the government places less weight on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions, the
more will the endogenous tariﬀ levels in both organized and unorganized sectors diverge from the
benchmark tariﬀ level. Otherwise, they will converge toward the benchmark. Moreover, it is also
true under both economic structures that protection levels in all sectors decrease with the fraction
of the population that belongs to a lobby group. Overall, therefore, we can conclude that the
endogenous protection pattern under monopolistic competition with intra-industry trade compares
similarly to that of perfect competition with inter-industry trade once we adjust for the diﬀerence
in their benchmark optimal tariﬀ levels.
This study also indicates that with monopolistic competition and intra-industry trade, the en-
dogenous tariﬀ level in an organized industry might be unbounded in some parameter setup. This
happens when a condition in the model holds, which depends on such demand and political param-
eters as the elasticity of substitution among varieties in the industry, the fraction of the population
that is represented by a lobby, and the weight that the government places on aggregate welfare
relative to campaign ﬁnancing. The higher is the fraction of the population that is represented by
3a lobby and the higher is the weight on aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function,
the smaller is the possibility for such an explosive tariﬀ.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the preference and production
structure of the model and derives the corresponding equations in the political framework of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994). Section 3 then investigates the protection pattern for intra-industry
trade in both the “small” industry case and the general case. Concluding remarks are collected in
Section 4.
2 The Model
Suppose that a country is populated by individuals with identical preferences but diﬀerent factor
endowments. On the preference side, each individual maximizes utility given by




where X0 is the consumption of homogeneous good 0 and Xi is an index of consumption of diﬀer-
entiated goods in industry i, i = 1;2;:::;n. The homogeneous good is taken as numeraire, with a
world and domestic price equal to 1. The index of consumption of diﬀerentiated goods in industry
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ik) is the consumption of domestic (foreign) variety k of good i and mi (m¤
i) is the















ik) is the consumer price at home for domestic (foreign) variety k of good i and
¾i = 1
1¡½i > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among diﬀerent varieties of good i. For simplicity, Ui
is assumed to take the form of Ei lnXi, which amounts to assuming that an individual allocates
4a ﬁxed amount of expenditure Ei for good i.1 The rest of the world is assumed to share the same
preference structure.
On the production side, the homogeneous good is assumed to be manufactured from labor alone
with constant returns to scale and a unit labor requirement equal to 1. It is produced both at home
and abroad, and is traded freely and costlessly. Therefore, the wage is equal to 1 universally.2
Production of the diﬀerentiated goods requires labor and a sector-speciﬁc input. Each variety of
the diﬀerentiated good i is assumed to require a ﬁxed amount of the sector-speciﬁc factor ki in order
to produce at all; after that, there is a constant unit labor requirement, ai. Assume that there are
a large number of varieties (home and foreign combined) available to the consumer. Then given
the preferences speciﬁed above, each variety’s producer faces an approximately constant elasticity
of demand, equal to ¾i. With proﬁt maximization, each domestic variety’s producer charges the
same price:




The sector-speciﬁc factors in this country are assumed to be available in inelastic supply ( ¯ Ki;i =
1;2;:::;n). Therefore, the size of a diﬀerentiated-good industry in a country is predetermined by
the amount of the sector-speciﬁc factor that the country is endowed with. That is, the number of
varieties produced at home in industry i would be mi = ¯ Ki=ki. It is assumed that the technology
abroad to produce the diﬀerentiated products is the same as that at home, so any diﬀerence in the
consumer price of a variety from home and from abroad would reﬂect only government intervention
and nothing else. That is,
p¤
ik = p¤
i = ¿i pi ¿i ¸ 0 (3)
where ¿i is the government intervention in sector i. For example, in the case of an import tariﬀ, ¿i
is one plus its ad valorem value.
In the presence of intra-industry trade, an export subsidy (tax) would help (hurt) the domestic
ﬁrms in the same way that an import tariﬀ (subsidy) would. The former expands (shrinks) the
domestic ﬁrms’ market shares in the export market, while the latter expands (shrinks) them in
1To see this, note that by the ﬁrst order condition, it holds that
@U
@X0 = ¸P0 or ¸ = 1. Similarly,
@U
@Xi = ¸Pi, or
Ei
Xi = Pi. It follows that Ei = PiXi.
2In this setup, the presence of the homogeneous good ties down the relative producer prices of the diﬀerentiated
goods from home and abroad, and hence eliminates possible terms of trade eﬀects from import tariﬀs or subsidies
that are applied to these goods. This point has been suggested by Helpman and Krugman (1989, p. 140) in a similar
structure.
5the domestic market. This study focuses on one of these two dimensions, and assumes that the
government only intervenes in trade using an import tariﬀ or subsidy.
Given the structure of preferences, we can solve the utility optimization problem in two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, an individual with an income of E will consume Xi = Di(Pi) of the index of
diﬀerentiated good i (where Di(Pi) = Ei=Pi) and X0 = E¡
P
i PiDi(Pi) of the homogeneous good.
The indirect utility function therefore can be expressed as





i PiDi(Pi) is the consumer surplus derived from consumption of
the index of the diﬀerentiated goods. Using equations (2) and (3), we can simplify the price index
for the diﬀerentiated good i in equation (1) as











which says that raising the import tariﬀ (subsidy) would reduce (enhance) an individual’s consumer
surplus.
In the second stage, with the given expenditure Ei on diﬀerentiated good i, the individual will
consume























































i )2 < 0: (7)
Therefore, a higher tariﬀ (subsidy) in industry i raises (lowers) the market shares of the home
produced varieties and lowers (raises) those of foreign varieties.
Take any tariﬀ level or subsidy rate imposed abroad, ¿¤
i , as given. A representative home
producer of diﬀerentiated good i will produce at the scale of
yi = Ndi(¿i) + N¤dif(¿¤
i )
where N(N¤) is total population at home (abroad) and dif is the foreign demand for a representative
home variety of good i, which is a mirror image of equation (5). Therefore, the aggregate reward
to the speciﬁc factor used in producing good i is
Πi(¿i;¿¤








a higher tariﬀ (subsidy) in sector i beneﬁts (hurts) the owners of the speciﬁc factor used in this
sector.






i; ¿ = (¿1;¿2;:::;¿n):
It is assumed that the government redistributes the revenue uniformly to each individual. Therefore,










> 0 if ¿i · 1;
starting with free trade, a small increase in the tariﬀ rate in any sector raises the transfer amount.











S 0 when ¿i T 1: (9)
That is, the consumer welfare (government transfer and consumer surplus combined) is highest at
the free trade level. Therefore, a general consumer without claims to any speciﬁc factor would be
hurt by any deviations from free trade.
In what follows, the political contribution framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994) will be
brieﬂy reviewed and applied to the present model, which allows us to investigate the endogenous
tariﬀ equilibrium in the next section.
As stated in equation (4), an individual’s welfare depends on his income level and the consumer
surplus he enjoys from the consumption of diﬀerentiated goods. A typical individual’s income
includes wages and government transfers, and possibly the reward from the ownership of some
sector-speciﬁc input. It is assumed that claims to the speciﬁc inputs are indivisible and nontradable
and individuals each own at most one type of speciﬁc factor. Given the fact that the owners of a
certain speciﬁc factor have a common interest in protection for their sector, they may choose to
unite their forces for political activity. It is assumed that in some exogenous set of sectors, denoted
L, the owners of the speciﬁc factors have been able to organize themselves into lobby groups. These
lobbies compete noncooperatively for the government’s favor and propose contribution schedules,
Ci(¿), contingent on the trade-policy vector set by the government, ¿, to maximize the joint welfare
of their members.3 The joint welfare of a lobby i, Vi, is its gross welfare Wi net of the contribution
Ci made to the government. We observe that
Wi(¿) = li + Πi(¿i) + ®iN[r(¿) + s(¿)] (10)
where li is the total labor supply (and also the labor income) of owners of the speciﬁc input used
in industry i and ®i is the fraction of the population that owns some of this speciﬁc factor.4
Faced with the contribution schedules oﬀered by the lobby groups, the government selects a
3As will be seen immediately, a lobby’s joint welfare is tied to other sectors’ tariﬀ rates as well as its own sector’s.
Therefore, a lobby will tailor its contribution schedule conditional on the whole vector of trade policies.
4Note that the total labor supply (population) of an industry and the lobby that represents it (the speciﬁc-factor
owners) are potentially diﬀerent. Equation (10) is only concerned with the welfare of the lobby members.




Ci(¿) + aW(¿) a ¸ 0 (11)
where W is the aggregate, gross-of-contributions welfare and a is the weight that the government
places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions. Aggregate gross welfare is the sum
of aggregate income, total tariﬀ revenue, and consumer surplus; that is,
W(¿) = l +
n X
i
Πi(¿i) + N[r(¿) + s(¿)]: (12)
To facilitate the exposition of tariﬀ equilibrium later, I will take the stricter version of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) in assuming that the contribution schedules are globally truthful. A
contribution schedule is globally truthful if it everywhere reﬂects the true preference of a lobby. As
shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994), if the contribution schedules are globally truthful, the




Wi(¿) + aW(¿): (13)
Let us ﬁrst calculate the impact of marginal trade policy changes on the welfare of various
lobbies. Using equations (8), (9), and (10), we ﬁnd that for lobby i, a small increase in ¿j will cause






















where ±ij is an indicator variable which equals 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Equation (14) says that
lobby i beneﬁts from an increase in the protection of its own sector, but is hurt by any deviations
from free trade in other sectors. Starting with free trade, a small increase in the protection of
sector i would induce domestic consumers to switch demand away from imported varieties in sector
i toward domestically produced varieties. This would increase domestic varieties’ production and
accordingly the proﬁt income (aggregate reward) to the speciﬁc-factor owners in sector i. On the
9other hand, for all other sectors, lobby i has only general interest as consumers in trade policies
that would aﬀect import prices in these sectors. We have seen in equation (9) that it is in the
best interest of consumers that free trade be implemented, when both government transfers and
consumer surplus are taken into account. Therefore, lobby i would prefer free trade in all sectors
but its own.
Next, we sum the expression in (14) for all i 2 L to obtain the joint impact on all lobbies of a
















i2L ±ij is an indicator variable that equals 1 if industry j is organized and 0 otherwise,
while ®L =
P
i2L ®i is the fraction of the total population that is represented by a lobby. Equa-
tion (15) states that starting with free trade, lobby members as a group beneﬁt from an increase in
the tariﬀ on any good that is produced by an organized sector, but are hurt by any deviations from
free trade in all unorganized sectors. This together with equation (14) indicates that as lobbies
each bid for a positive tariﬀ in their own sectors but free trade in all other sectors, they jointly bid
for import tariﬀs in all organized sectors but free trade in all unorganized sectors. This lobbying
pattern for trade policies is diﬀerent from that in Grossman and Helpman (1994), in which lobbying
activity as a whole bids for import tariﬀs (or export subsidies) in all organized sectors but import
subsidies (or export taxes) in all unorganized sectors.
Finally, let us calculate the eﬀect of a marginal tariﬀ change on aggregate welfare. Using

























Equation (16) says that starting with free trade in sector j, a small increase in ¿j improves the
national welfare because of the increase in proﬁt. Therefore, if the incumbent government is not
inﬂuenced by lobby activities and maximizes aggregate welfare when setting trade policies, the
optimal tariﬀs would be positive for every sector. This diﬀers from the benchmark trade policy in
10Grossman and Helpman (1994) when the government is not politically motivated, as free trade in
every sector is eﬃcient for a small, competitive economy that is studied in their model.
3 The Endogenous Tariﬀ Equilibrium
We are now ready to investigate the equilibrium trade policies that would emerge in the campaign-











= (Ij + a)Nmj(pj ¡ aj)
@dj
@¿j







The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for an equilibrium trade-policy vector ¿ requires that @ ˜ G
@¿j = 0 for
j = 1;2;:::;n. When the equilibrium in a sector does exist, the tariﬀ satisﬁes the following implicit
function:











However, as will be discussed later, an equilibrium tariﬀ for an industry does not necessarily exist in
certain circumstances, so to investigate the existence and the properties of the tariﬀ that maximizes























R(¿j) is the ratio of the changes in the market sizes of a home variety relative to a foreign variety
in industry j when ¿j varies, while S(¿j) can be viewed as the ratio of the weights attached to the
consumer welfare loss relative to the producer welfare gain. Since Z(¿j) > 0, the FOC is equivalent
to R(¿j) = S(¿j). When R(¿j) < S(¿j), lowering ¿j would increase the objective function ˜ G; when












































We can also show that













Therefore, R(¿j) is a monotonic increasing function in ¿j starting from zero and increasing toward
inﬁnity with the slope approaching
(¾j¡1)m¤
j
¾jmj as ¿j becomes large. Nevertheless, we are not sure
about the curvature of R(¿j). Intuitively speaking, when ¿j increases, the demand for a domestic
variety, dj, increases, while the demand for a foreign variety, d¤
j, decreases. However, the rate of
increase in dj is bigger than the rate of decrease in d¤
j. Therefore, as ¿j increases, R increases.
However, the rate of the increase in R could be increasing, constant, or decreasing, depending on
¿j and the parameters. This schedule is only inﬂuenced by the demand and production parameters
and not by political factors, so it will stay the same as we alter the political scenarios.




depends on the parameters that characterize the political environment as well as the demand and
production structure. Let So(¿j) and Su(¿j) denote the schedule when the industry is “organized”
(Ij = 1) and “unorganized” (Ij = 0), respectively. In addition, it will serve as a benchmark to
look at the schedule that corresponds to the circumstance where politics is not present and the




mj (¿j ¡ 1). Let Sb(¿j) denote this schedule. In sum, the corresponding equations of

















3.1 The Small Industry Equilibrium
When an industry is “small” such that the number of varieties produced at home relative to the
rest of the world is negligible (
mj
m¤
j ! 0), the corresponding R(¿j) schedule becomes strictly convex.





! 0; R(¿j) ! (¾j ¡ 1)¿
¾j
j ;
which is a strictly convex function of ¿j. On the other hand, the schedules, Su;Sb;So, all converge
to the vertical line which passes through ¿j = 1. Since 0 < R(1) = ¾j ¡ 1 < 1, it must be the
case that R(¿j) and S(¿j) intersect once at ¿j = 1 and we have a unique equilibrium ¿j = 1. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.
Therefore, when the number of varieties produced at home relative to the rest of the world in
an industry is negligible, the industry can not secure any import protection from the government,
regardless of whether the government has the national interest in mind or is politically motivated.
Intuitively speaking, although a rise in the tariﬀ on a certain industry beneﬁts the producers of
home varieties, it hurts the consumers who deem the home varieties as imperfect substitutes for
the foreign varieties. When the number of varieties produced at home is negligible relative to
the rest of the world, the gain in proﬁt by raising the tariﬀ is overwhelmed by the loss in the
consumer welfare. This is true even when the government takes the lobbies’ interests into account
and weighs the production gain proportionately more against the consumer loss, as indicated in
equation (17). Therefore, free trade is optimal for such a “small” industry with a negligible share
of world production, whether the government is politically inﬂuenced or not.
In general, it can be shown that as the number of varieties produced at home relative to the
rest of the world in an industry decreases (
mj
m¤
j #), the endogenous tariﬀ level as in equation (18)
decreases. In other words, a larger industry will receive higher protection, regardless of whether the
13industry is represented by a lobby group or not. In Grossman and Helpman (1994), however, this
is only true for organized sectors. When an organized sector has a larger domestic output relative
to imports, it is protected by higher import tariﬀs. The size eﬀect works in the opposite direction if
the sector is unorganized. The larger is an unorganized industry relative to its imports, the bigger
is the magnitude of negative protection (import subsidies) it will receive.
3.2 The General Tariﬀ Equilibrium
This section studies the general pattern of protection when the number of varieties produced at
home relative to the rest of the world in an industry is not negligible.
As a benchmark, let us start by investigating the optimal tariﬀ level when political activities
are not present and the government is benevolent. It can be shown that @R
@¿j < @Sb
@¿j for all ¿j > 0.
Therefore, R(¿j) and Sb(¿j) intersect at a single point. Let ¿b
j denote the corresponding tariﬀ . This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 2. Depending on the demand and production parameters, there
are other even more wiggly shapes that are possible for the schedule R(¿j), but the slope of R(¿j)
should be always less than that of Sb(¿j). Since R(¿j) > Sb(¿j) for all ¿j < ¿b
j and R(¿j) < Sb(¿j)
for all ¿j > ¿b
j, ˜ G(¿b
j) is the local (and global) maximum and ¿b
j is the optimal tariﬀ. It is easy




j > 0. Hence, the optimal tariﬀ rate is strictly positive for an
industry with non-negligible intra-industry trade. This veriﬁes the observations made earlier on
equation (16).
If instead political activities are present but the industry is unorganized, the relevant S(¿j)
schedule is Su(¿j). Because Su(¿j) has a bigger slope than Sb(¿j), it follows that @R
@¿j < @Su
@¿j for




j > 0 . Hence, the equilibrium
tariﬀ for an unorganized industry, ¿u
j , is unique and the tariﬀ rate is strictly positive as shown in
Figure 3. However, the protection is less than the optimal tariﬀ level the industry would otherwise
be granted by a benevolent government.
If the industry is organized, it is no longer necessarily true that @R
@¿j < @So
@¿j for all ¿j > 0. There-
fore, an equilibrium tariﬀ in this sector does not necessarily exist. However, when an equilibrium
does exist as in Figure 4, the tariﬀ level, ¿o
j , would be higher than that imposed by a benevolent
government. To see this, observe that R(¿b
j) = Sb(¿b
j) and Sb(¿j) > So(¿j) for all ¿j > 1, so it
follows that R(¿b
j) > So(¿b
j). As a result, ¿o
j must be higher than ¿b
j.
14The foregoing conclusion about the endogenous tariﬀs in unorganized and organized sectors
relative to those imposed by a benevolent government is actually very intuitive. Recall from equa-
tions (15) and (16) that when contributions are the only consideration for the government, the
lobbying forces as a whole would prompt the government to impose positive tariﬀs in organized
sectors and free trade in unorganized sectors. On the other hand, when national welfare is the only
concern, a benevolent government would prefer positive tariﬀs in all sectors. When both political
and national interests are taken into account as in (17), these two forces would restrain each other
and the end result is that the endogenous tariﬀ in the unorganized sector falls below the benchmark
tariﬀ level while the endogenous tariﬀ in the organized sector rises above the benchmark tariﬀ level.
As the government puts more weight on the national interest (a "), the endogenous tariﬀs in
either organized or unorganized sectors approach the optimal tariﬀ level imposed by a benevolent
government. On the other hand, as the government puts more weight on campaign contributions,
the endogenous tariﬀs approach the desired levels of the lobbies. To see this, look at equation (19)




j. In contrast, as a ! 0, Su(¿j) and So(¿j) diverge with the former approaching the vertical
line and the latter approaching
®Lm¤
j¾j
mj (¿j ¡ 1), which is the ﬂattest possible line for So(¿j) in a
given industry. Therefore, we have ¿u
j converge to the free trade level and ¿o
j converge to its highest
possible level, which is the desired result of the lobbies.
In addition to the weight the government places on aggregate welfare, the protection pattern
across industries is also aﬀected by the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby.
As the fraction becomes higher (®L ! 1), the emphasis on the loss in consumer welfare as in
equation (17) rises in the government’s decision. Therefore, the tariﬀs in each sector would be
reduced. The opposite is true when the fraction draws close to 0. This can be illustrated with








j converging to ¿b
j. In contrast, as ®L ! 0, Su(¿j) and So(¿j) pivot to the right with the
former approaching Sb(¿j) and the latter approaching
am¤
j¾j




j converging to ¿b
j.
Therefore, the protection provided to all unorganized (organized) industries increase (fall) with
the relative weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-` a-vis campaign contributions
15and fall with the fraction of the population that belongs to an organized lobby group.
It is interesting to note that the endogenous protection pattern that emerges from this study
actually parallels that of Grossman and Helpman (1994) very much, if we adjust for the diﬀerence
in the benchmark (optimal) tariﬀ levels, which are free trade in Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a
small competitive economy and positive tariﬀs in the current study with monopolistic competition.
Under both economic structures, the protection levels for organized sectors are higher than the
benchmark level while they are lower than the benchmark level for all unorganized sectors. As
the government places less weight on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions, the
more will the endogenous tariﬀ levels in both organized and unorganized sectors diverge from the
benchmark tariﬀ level. Otherwise, they will converge toward the benchmark. Moreover, it is also
true under both economic structures that protection levels in all sectors decrease with the fraction
of the population that belongs to a lobby group. Overall, therefore, we can conclude that the
endogenous protection pattern under monopolistic competition with intra-industry trade compares
similarly to that of perfect competition with inter-industry trade once we adjust for the diﬀerence
in their benchmark optimal tariﬀ levels.
Our last task is to explore the condition that guarantees the existence of a political equilibrium
tariﬀ in an organized sector under the economic structure of monopolistic competition and intra-
industry trade.
PROPOSITION 1 The endogenous tariﬀ for an organized industry j exists if @R
@¿j < @So
@¿j as










1+a , the endogenous tariﬀ is
explosive.
[PROOF]: Since R(¿j) is a strictly increasing function with R(0) = 0 and So(¿j) is a linear function
with So(1) = 0, if @R
@¿j < @So
@¿j as ¿j ! 1, the schedule R(¿j) must have intersected the schedule
So(¿j) at an odd number of points and fall below it after the ﬁnal intersection. Therefore, the
highest tariﬀ level that satisﬁes the FOC is bounded and corresponds to a local (and potentially
a global) maximum of ˜ G(¿j). The global maximum of ˜ G(¿j), chosen among the local maxima,
therefore exists and we have a ﬁnite endogenous tariﬀ in the organized industry. The situation is










the condition that lim¿j!1
@R
@¿j < @So












16On the other hand, if @R
@¿j > @So





1+a , R(¿j) would rise above
So(¿j) eventually. It follows that R(¿j) ¡ So(¿j) > 0 after the ﬁnal intersection, and it is always
beneﬁcial to continue increasing the tariﬀ. Therefore, the endogenous tariﬀ level is unbounded and
explosive. The situation is illustrated in Figure 8. Note that in either of the scenarios, the condition





1+a , the endogenous tariﬀ could be either
ﬁnite or explosive. Q.E.D.
Therefore, the endogenous tariﬀ level for an organized industry might rise without limit. This





1+a in the model holds for an organized industry j. This
condition depends on such demand and political parameters as the elasticity of substitution among
varieties in this industry, the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby, and the
weight that the government places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign ﬁnancing. The higher
is the fraction of the population that is represented by a lobby and the higher is the weight on
aggregate welfare in the government’s objective function, the smaller is the possibility for such an
explosive tariﬀ.5
This is also very intuitive and ties closely to the observations made above on the eﬀects of the
parameters ®L and a on the protection patterns. Both higher ®L and higher a would raise the slope
of So(¿j) and shift it toward Sb(¿j). This makes it more possible to realize the condition, @R
@¿j < @So
@¿j
as ¿j ! 1, and to have a ﬁnite endogenous tariﬀ in an organized industry.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the political equilibrium of trade policy when economic structure is char-
acterized by diﬀerentiated products and increasing returns to scale and there exists intra-industry
trade. This is accomplished by embedding the Krugman (1980) model into the Ricardo-Viner
speciﬁc-factors model and employing the political contribution framework of Grossman and Help-
man (1994) to derive the endogenous tariﬀ equilibrium.
The result shows that endogenous tariﬀs are positive for all industries with non-negligible shares
of world production. However, the level of protection is less than the optimal tariﬀ that would
otherwise be imposed by a benevolent government if the industry is unorganized, and higher if















17the industry is organized. As the fraction of the population that belongs to an organized lobby
group increases, the tariﬀ in the sector decreases; the opposite is true when the fraction draws
close to zero. The protection pattern across industries is also aﬀected by the relative weight the
government attaches to aggregate welfare vis-` a-vis campaign contributions. As the relative weight
increases, the endogenous tariﬀs in either organized or unorganized sectors converge to the optimal
tariﬀ levels that would otherwise be imposed by a benevolent government. On the other hand, as
the government puts more weight on campaign contributions, the endogenous tariﬀs would diverge,
with those in unorganized sectors approaching the free trade level and those in organized sectors
approaching the desired levels of the lobbies.
The model also indicates that the political equilibrium of the tariﬀ level in an organized industry
might be explosive. The higher is the fraction of the population represented by a lobby and the
higher is the weight the government places on aggregate welfare relative to campaign contributions,
the smaller is the possibility for such an explosive tariﬀ.
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Figure 2: Optimal Tariﬀ in No-Politics Case
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20Figure 3: Endogenous Tariﬀ in Unorganized Sector
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Figure 4: Endogenous Tariﬀ in Organized Sector when a unique equilibrium exists
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Figure 5: Endogenous Tariﬀs as a varies
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21Figure 6: Endogenous Tariﬀs as ®L varies
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Figure 7: Finite Endogenous Tariﬀ in Organized Sector
0 1 1 0 tj tj
R,S R,S









Figure 8: Explosive Endogenous Tariﬀ in Organized Sector
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